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CONSPIRACY REVISITED
RICHARD ARBNs*
INTRODUCTION
The increasing reliance placed on massive group organization
in the attainment of political and economic power objectives since
the Industrial Revolution highlights the significance of such group
organization as an instrumentality of both social integration and
collapse. These conditions increasingly prompt direction of the
available battery of criminal prosecution at threatening or seem-
ingly threatening foci of group concentrations of both wealth
and power. No contemporary industrial nation state has escaped
these effects. Each has engaged in the increasing prosecution of
group crime at the price of a diminution in the traditional protec-
tion accorded to the individual defendant by democratic justice.'
In Angelo-American law, the trend of decision has been ex-
emplified in the development of the doctrine of conspiracy. Stand-
ard definitions of the emerging doctrine, however, have only suc-
ceeded in raising more questions than they could answer.2  Mr.
Justice Jackson enjoyed the overwhelming support of contem-
porary legal scholarship in this comment on the prevailing anarchy
of conspiracy categorization:
The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost de-
fies definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements,
it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each
of the many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.
It is always 'predominantly mental in composition' because it
consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent.8
The conspiracy doctrine thus deserves renewed examination
in the light of its continued expansion and inherent ambiguity.
One may do well, therefore, to pose the classic inquiry once again:
"Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed
That he is grown so great ?"
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, School of Law.
1. See, e. g., Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crine or
Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276 (1948). Cf. Wagner, Con-
spiracy in Civil Law Countries, 42 J. CaRm. L. & CRIMIorL. 171 (1951).
2. See, e. g., 3 BumcK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 985 (1946) : "Owing to the various
ends and means of conspiracies, and for the further reason that there is much difference injudicial opinion as to the interpretation of the word 'umlawlul' as used in such cases,
it is very difficult to frame a definition of conspiracy that will cover all cases, In fact,
it has been said that it is, perhaps, more difficult to give exact definition of conspiracy
than any other crime." SEARS AND WEXHOFEN, MAY'S LAW o1 CRIMES 168-171(4th ed. 1938). Cf. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of LA. L. REV. 624(1941) : "In the long category of crimes, there is none, not excepting criminal attempt,
more difficult to confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than 'conspiracy'."
See also Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy. 35 GEO. L. J. 328, 329 (1947): "It
can be unequivocally affirmed that the crime of conspiracy at common law is the most
difficult to define.'
3. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, in Krulewtch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440,
446 (1949).
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I.
The foundation for the contemporary law of conspiracy was
laid by the inception of the conspiracy prosecution in medieval
England. It is significant that the first discoverable concept of
"conspiracy" was that of a "consummated" as distinct from an
"inchoate" offense, (successively viewed as civil, quasi-criminal,
and criminal in character). Early "conspiracy" by its inherent
nature, was therefore marked by the inevitable presence of mani-
fest harmful effects or "substantive evil".
Concise and classical summary of the "sea-change" under-
gone by this concept in the course of its early development has
been provided by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen :4
The crime of conspiracy . . . has a remarkable history.
In very early times the word has a completely different meaning
from that which we attach to it. This appears from two early
statutes, the first is the Articuli super (hartas (28 Edw. 1, A. D.
1300) which was intended to supplement and enforce Magna
Charta. The tenth chapter begins: 'In right of conspirators,
false informers, and evil procurers of dozens, assizes, inquests,
and juries, the king has provided remedy for the plaintiffs by a
writ out of chancery. And notwithstanding he willeth that his
justices of the one bench and of the other, and justices assigned
to take assizes, when they come into the country to do their office
shall upon every plaint made unto them award inquests there-
upon without writ, and shall do right unto the plaintiffs without
delay.'
In the 33 Edw. 1 (1304) there is a definition of conspirators:
'Conspirators be they who do confeder or bind themselves by
oath, covenant, or other alliance, that every of them shall aid
and bear the other falsely and maliciously to indict or cause to
indict, or falsely to move or maintain pleas; and also such as
cause children within age to appeal men of felony whereby they
are imprisoned and sore grieved; and such as retain men in the
country with liveries of fees to maintain their malicious enter-
prises; and this extendeth as well to the takers as to the givers;
and stewards and bailiffs of great lords which by their seignory
office or power undertake to bear and maintain quarrels, pleas,
or debates that concern other parties than such as touch the es-
tates of their lords or themselves.
The earliest meaning of conspiracy was thus a combination
to carry on legal proceedings in a vexatious or improper way,
and the writ of conspiracy, and the power given by the Articuli
super Chartas to proceed without such a writ, were the forerun-
4. 2 STEPHEN:, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 227-229 (1883). For
similarly brief summary of early legal history, see Harno, Intent in Criminal Con;-
spiracy, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 624, 624-625 (1941).
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ners of our modern actions for malicious prosecution. Orig-
inally, therefore, conspiracy was rather a particular kind of civil
injury but like many other civil injuries it was also punishable
on indictment, at the suit of the king, and upon a conviction
the offender was liable to an extremely severe punishment which
was called 'the villian judgment'.
So ingrained was the view of conspiracy as a substantive
offense in this vein that as late as the 17th century "conspiracy"
could still command the argument that it was an offense requiring
the procurement of harmful results to be actionable., It could
thus still be "moved and strongly urged by defendants' counsel,
that admitting . . . (a) combination, confederacy, and agreement
between . . . [defendants] to indict the plaintiff to be false, and
malicious, . . . yet no action lies for it . . . (if) the party
grieved . . [has been] indicted, and legitimo modo acquiotatus."G
This argument was presented in the celebrated Poulterers' Case
and was rejected by the Court of Star Chamber.7 There, plaintiff,
after securing his acquittal in criminal trial, had brought suit
against a combination of poulterers who had acted as the com-
plaining witnesses against him in pursuance of an "agreement
betwixt them falsely and maliciously to charge the plaintiff [who
had married the widow of a poulterer] . . . with the robbery of
. . . [one of the defendants] . . . to procure him to be indicted,
arraigned, adjudged, and hanged." s In what turned out to be a
classic departure from the earlier law, though justified by refer-
ence to dubious common law precedents, the Court of Star Cham-
ber, allowed the writ upon the theory that the mere act of wrong-
ful agreement of two or more persons to commit maintenance
suffices to make a "conspiracy" actionable. No further action
was deemed necessary :"
And it is true that a writ of conspiracy lies not, unless the
party is indicted, and legitimo modo acquietatus, for so are the
words of the writ; but that a false conspiracy betwixt divers
persons shall be punished, although nothing be put in execu-
tion is full and manifest in our books; . . . confederacy to
indict or acquit, although nothing is executed, is punishable by
law . . . [Before] the unlawful act . . . [isl executed the
law punishes the coadunation, confederacy or false alliance to
5. A change in the concept of necessary harmful results had however become
manifest. See, e. g., 3 COKE INSTITUTES 142-143. Cf. HARRISON, CONSPIRACY AS A
CRIM AND AS TORT IN ENGLISH LAW 13 (1924). See also, generally, WINFIELD,
HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PaocEDuR (1921) ; 4 BLACKSTONE, CoM!-
MENTARIES c. X. 136-137.
6. The Poulterers' Case, (1611) 9 Coke Rep. 55 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 813.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Id., Eng. Rep. 814-815.
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the end to prevent the unlawful act . . . and in these cases
the common law is a law of mercy, for it prevents the malignant
from doing mischief, and the innocent from suffering it.
It may well be said that "[w ith the decision in the Poul-
terer's Case a new crime was in the making. It [conspiracy]
became an inchoate crime similar to attempt."10 Unlike "attempt"
which was characterized by acceptance of such concrete standards
as dangerous proximity to specific harms, "conspiracy" seemed
endowed with a transcendent vagueness as to means and ends.
The precise nature of the sought for preventive rather than puni-
tive function which it was to fulfill as a "law of mercy" remained
hazy. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in viewing this Star Chamber
doctrine as adopted in due course by the Court of King's Bench,
remarked that it was expressed so widely or loosely, that it be-
came in course of time a head of law of great importance, and
capable of almost indefinite extension."' It may well be added
in fact, that the creative potential of "conspiracy" inhered in
the very vagueness of its concept.
The "making" of the "new crime" was first highlighted by
case law.
In 1663, the Court of King's Bench, allowed a prosecution for
a ''conspiracy for lucre and gain" which was not based on any
attempt at the abuse of judicial procedure, but instead upon an
attempt "to extort several sums of money" by a threat "to
disgrace one with a bastard."12
In 1664, the same court sustained an information for con-
spiracy against London brewers which alleged that they did
"factiously and unlawfully assemble . . . and conspire to im-
poverish the excise-men, and made orders that no small-beer . . .
should be made . . . to be sold to the poor . . . but of such a
price, with intent to move the common people to pull down the
Excise House, and bring the excise-men into the hatred of the
people, and to impoverish and disable them from paying their
rent . . . to the King." The majority of the Court held "that the
bare conspiracy in this case to diminish the King's revenue, with-
out any act done is finable." Thereupon, the report notes," they
fined [one defendant] . . . 1000 marks and the others 300 marks
each."" 3 It was clear that in becoming an inchoate offense, con-
spiracy had been emancipated from the restrictions of its original
status.
10. Harno, supra note 4 at 626.
11. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 4 at 229.
12. The King against Tymberly, (1663) 1 Keb. 254, 83 Eng. Rep. 930; Cf. The
King against Rispal, (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 206.
13. The King against Alderman Sterling and seventeen others, (1664) 1 Lev. 126,
83 Eng. Rep. 331.
245
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It is recognized, in passing, that the "acceptance of this
[Star-Chamber] doctrine, in its broad implications, by the common
law courts . . . did not come about without some misgivings."14
A creature of the courts, a foot-loose conspiracy doctrine
appeared unpredictable. From early times its character was de-
rived from the offense on which it was "overlaid." Could it be
safely overlaid on many others? In due course the experiment
was under way. Thus conspiracy entered a period of growth and
inutation within the expanding confines of a changing Criminal
Law:
[M]any acts were coming to be regarded as crimes which
had not been formerly so regarded, and consequently combina-
tions to do such acts were treated as criminal conspiracies."
The emerging form of conspiracy was classically characterized
by Lord Denman as embodying an agreement "either to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means."' 0 The meaning
of "unlawful" remained vague but received an increasingly liberal
construction. Thus the contemplated illegality could clearly be a
statutory violation; but it could also be a combination directed
against the financial or political interest of the government 7 or
against the general public interest 8 or against public morality,"9
all without necessarily connoting a specifically proscribed crim-
inality.
In this context it was the illicit agreement or combination
which rendered all parties thereto punishable without any further
action. Beyond the enactment of this measure of individual re-
sponsibility for group participation the new law held each con-
spirator liable for the acts of his fellows in furtherance of thp
general criminal design to which all were parties. 20
More than a century ago the law of conspiracy had thus
become a potential weapon of almost unlimited repression in the
service of industrialized society.
14. Harno, supra note 4 at 627.
15. HAmiso-, op. cit. supra note 5 at 20.
16. The King Against Jones And Others, 4 B. & Ad. 345 (1832), 110 Eng. Rep.
485, 487: "The indictment ought to charge a conspiracy, either to do an unlawful act,
or a lawful act by unlawful means".
17. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge, (1721) 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9. See
also R. v. De Berenger, (1814) 3 M & S 67 declaring that a criminal conspiracy could
be founded on an agreement to raise the price of public funds by spreading rumors. A
good discussion of many of the early conspiracy cases is provided in State v. Buchanan,
5 H and J. 317 (Md. 1821).
18. See, e. g., O'Connell v. Regina, (1844) 11 Cl. & F. 155.
19. Rex v. Delaval, (1763) 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913.
20. Rex. v. Stone, (1796) 100 Eng. Rep. 684.
For a brief view of the further development of this aspect of the conspiracy
doctrine see MiLLER, HANDBOOK OF CRimxiNA LAw 114 (1934).
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Recent history has brought about even more significant
changes in the development of the dominant patterns of this
"conspiracy."
Since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the conspiracy
doctrine has been virtually uninhibited. In consequence the doc-
trine has reached more and more phases of the community pro-
"cess. Today the once fledgling law of conspiracy seems to have
come of age. It is not unfair to state that its contemporary
magnitude far exceeds the fondest expectations entertained by its
Star Chamber progenitors for its future. Its contemporary pro-
trayal throws such traits as these in bold relief. It suffices today
under, e. g., contemporary federal criminal law, if the "illicit"
agreement to be established as the foundation of the "conspiracy'"
is shown as directed not at the violation of a criminal statute but
at a civil statute,2 ' or even at internal administrative regulations
with a view to "impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful
function of any department of government." ' 22  A characteristic
example of state criminal legislation renders actionable not only
an agreement to commit crime, falsely and maliciously indict
another for crime, falsely to institute or maintain "an action or
special proceeding", etc., etc., but also to "commit any act in-
jurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or
commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice."2 3
In this contemporary context, it is also the illicit agreement or
combination which renders all parties thereto punishable without
any further action. Beyond the enactment of this measure of in-
dividual responsibility for group participation the contemporary
law, too, holds each conspirator liable for the acts of his fellows
in furtherance of the general criminal design to which all are
parties. 24
As the scope of the conspiracy concept has continued to
increase in size the requisite proof for the establishment of the
underlying agreement in conspiracy prosecutions has significantly
shrunk Thus, today, it is permissible to prove the crime of con-
spiracy by a showing of the requisite mental state within the
context of the appropriate association of would-be malefactors.
The requisite mental state, however, need not be shown to have
21. United States v. Winner, 28 F. 2d 295 (N. D. Ill. 1928) ; United States v.
Hutto, 256 U. S. 524 (1921).
22. See Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479 (1910). Cf. Bridges v. United States,
346 U. S. 209 (1953). For underlying statute see 18 U. S. C. § 371.
23. See N. Y. PENAL LAw § 580. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38 § 138 (1951) and the
discussion of operative Illinois concepts of "conspiracy" in Proposed Revisions in the
Illinois Crindnal Code, 48 NORTHWVSTERN U. L. Rxv. 198, 204-210 (1953).
24. See e. g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (1946). Cf. People v.
Lyon, 1 N. Y. Crim. 400 (1883), aff'd, 33 Hun. 623 (1884).
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become manifested by simultaneous action or agreement between
the conspirators.25 The association which is established need not
be direct and simultaneous, and may be tenuous and indeed invis-
ible to the barb eye.26  A conspirator may, in fact, be ignorant of
the very identity of his conspiratorial associates. 27  For there is
much that is peculiar to the contemporary law of conspiracy:
A conspiracy is an offense which is usually established by a
great number of apparently disconnected circumstances which,
when taken together, throw light on whether the accused have
an understanding or are in common agreement. The agreement
need not be in any particular form. It is sufficient that the
minds of the parties met understandingly. A mutual implied
understanding is sufficient so far as the combination or con-
federacy is concerned. The agreement is generally a matter of
inference, deduced from the acts of the persons accused, which
are done on pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose, that is
to say, it is not necessary that the participation of the accused
be shown by direct evidence. The connection may be inferred
from such facts and circumstances in evidence as legitimately
tend to sustain that inference. This is so because it is rarely
capable of proof by direct evidence. 8
It has been observed in this connection, that "[t]he liberality
with which the courts have permitted the prosecution of business
enterprises for engaging in conspiracies to monopolize or restrain
trade is the most significant example of . . (a) relaxation of
proof. In attaching liability for, violations of the Sherman Act,
the courts have tended to direct their attention to the presence
of proscribed activities, instead of to the evidence of the ac-
cused's intent. By engaging in concerted economic activities which
operate in fact to restrain trade, the defendants may be charged
with having agreed to effect the unlawful results, thereby making
proof of a specific intent to restrain trade unnecessary." 2  One
wonders at what stage the described " Irelaxation of proof" effects
the creation of a new substantive crime by judicial fiat.
It appears almost as though the development of the "con-
spiracy" doctrine has thus moved full circle-from its medieval
25. Schenk v. United States. 253 Fed. 212, 213 (E. D. Pa. 1918), aff'd, 249 U. S.
47 (1918). Cf. discussion of "generic conspiracies" for purposes of criminal prosecu-
tions under the Sherman Act in DESSION, CmRmiAL, LAw, ADXINISTRATION & PUBLIC
ORDR 526-527 (1948). Cf. Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565 (1874).
26. See Allen v. United States, 4 F. 2d 688 (7th Cir. 1925) ; United Slates v.
Georga, 210 F. 2d 45 (3d Cir. 1954). Cf. Rex. v. Meyrick & Ribuffi, (1929) 21 Cir.
App. R. 94, 45 T. L. R. 421; William Goldman Theatres v. Loewus Inc., 150 2d 738.
(3d Cir. 1945).
27. Rex v. Meyrick and Ribuffi, supra note 26; United States ',. Direct Sales Co.,
44 F. Supp. 623 (W. D. S. C. 1942).
28. United States v. Glasser, 116 F. 2d 690, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1940).
29. Note, Guilt by Association--Three Words it; Search of a Meaning, 17 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 148, 153-154 (1947) and see cases cited therein. Cf. McKcrnan v.
Fraser, (1931) 46 Commonwealth L. Rep. 343.
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inception as a "consummated" offense, marked by the inevitable
presence of manifest harmful effects or "substantive evil",
through its metamorphosis as an "inchoate" crime, designed to
"prevent the malignant from doing mischief, and the innocent
from suffering it" under a "law of mercy" to its contemporary
culmination in a dual role either an "inchoate" offense or more
significantly as a "consummated" substantive crime, marked by
the presence of manifest harmful effects or "substantive evil",
which can be exemplified by "economic activities which operate in
fact to restrain trade."
Contemporary life is marked by a rising abundance of both
types of conspiracy prosecutions.
As the pattern of "conspiracy" prosecutions continues to
unfold in mounting tempo, it is not surprising to detect judicial
recognition of the "conspiracy" tool as frequently harsh and
arbitrary.80
II.
It is one of the facts of the life of the law that the prosecutor
appears irresistibly drawn to the conspiracy prosecution. What,
we may ask, are the fatal charms exerted by the law of conspiracy
to effect such a magnetism?
The characteristic contemporary conspiracy doctrine, aside
from the "chameleon-like . . . special coloration" it derives
"from each of the many independent offenses on which it maybe overlaid" can perhaps be best described as conformable to thefollowing standards of both substantive and procedural content:
1. A "conspiracy" is an agreement between two or more
persons either to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by un-
lawful means."'
30. See Saeta. Prohibition and the Hawkins Doctrine, 66 U. S. L. Rev. 75, 81,
n. 49 (1932), quoting Taft, C. J., Meeting of Senior Circuit judges, June 16, 1925,
reproduced in part in DESSIo N, CRiMINAL LAw, ADMINISTRATION & PUBLIC ORDER(1948) 531. See also Hand, J. speaking for the Court in United States v. Falcone,
109 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) :[Today] many prosecutors seek to sweep within the drag-net of conspiracy
all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main
offenders. That there are opportunities of great oppression in such a doctrineis very plain, and it is, only by circumscribing the scope of such all com-prehensive indictments that they can be avoided.
Cf. Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F. 2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Hyde v. United States,
225 U. S. 34 (1911).
31. The King Against Jones, (1832) 4 B & Ad. 345, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487.See also United States v. Westbrook, 114 F. Supp. 192, 196 (1953) :[The] gist of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement and
. where a conspiracy is alleged it is not necessary to set out the criminal
object of the conspiracy with as great certainty as is required in cases where
such object is charged as a substantive offense
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The full meaning of "lawfulness" within this context does not
appear to be firmly settled for all cases. Thus, e. g., an agreement
may be turned into a criminal conspiracy even though the attain-
ment of its objective seems impossible at the time of its consum-
mation.8 2 Moreover, the legislature "may make it a crime to con-
spire with others to do what an individual may lawfully do on his
0* .7 ,83
In the words of the United States Supreme Court:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to com-
mit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is
an offense of the gravest character, some times quite outweigh-
ing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the con-
templated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the
laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and
habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy,
rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its dis-
covery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when dis-
covered.3 4
The requirement has never been officially repudiated that
the agreement, underlying an actionable conspiracy, be character-
ized by a specific intent "either to do an unlawful act, or a lawful
act by unlawful means." It is traditional, therefore, to declare
that "conspiracy involves a specific intent to commit a particular
act, the perpetration of which the state [or government] desires to
forestall."' 5  A corollary of such a declaration is the rule that
"to establish a criminal conspiracy . . . [the] state [or govern-
ment] must prove an agreement on the part of two or more per-
sons and it must prove that the common intent flowing from that
agreement was specific and was criminal. "
2. The existing standards of proof in this field frequently
obviate the presentation of independent evidence to prove the
necessary specific intent with regard to:
(a) the formation of the conspiracy, (b) the objective of
the varying co-conspirators; throughout their operation such
standards tend to the advantage of the prosecution and the
disadvantage of the defense in the general development of
trial tactics.
32. See, e. g., United States v. Perlstein, 126 F. 2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
316 U. S. 678 (1942).
33. Mr. Justice Jackson concurring, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494,
573 (1951). Cf. State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A. 2d 63 (1939).
34. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915). Cf. State v. Kemp,
supra note 33. See also, SEARS AND WEIHOFEN, MAY'S LAW OF CaIMs 169-170 (4th
ed. 1938).
35. Harno, stipra note 4 at 635.
36. Ibid.; cf. CLARK & MARsHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 126 (1952);
SEARS & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 34 at 128.
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Since conspiratorial methods are assumed to be "devious,
hidden, secret and clandestine ,37 the gist of the crime, i. e., the
illicit agreement is not deemed susceptible to proof by independent
circumstantial evidence and may instead be freely inferred from
the circumstances of the overt association, however remote their
logical relevance to the crime charged. The judicial discretion
available in the admission of such "logically relevant" evidence
within such a context appears almost immune from any effe~tive
allegation of abuse. In the words of a recent decision :38
It should be borne in mind that in a conspiracy case wide lati-
tude is allowed in presenting evidence and it is within the dis-
cretion of the tial court to aamit evidence which even remotely
tends to establish the conspiracy charged.
In this context, moreover, as has been noted n6twithstanding
the judicial reiteration of a necessity for a showing of a "common
design", the prosecution is not bound to establish the necessary
conspiratorial connection of an individual defendant by a showing
that he joined the conspiracy in the beginning simultaneously with
its founders, or "that he . . . [had] complete knowledge of' all
the aims of the conspirators, or that he . . . [took] part in each
branch of the conspiracy, or that he even . . . [knew] of all the
steps taken toward the common design . . . "3 As has been indi-
cated above, a conspirator may in fact be ignorant of the very
identity of his conspiratorial associates and still not escape
criminal liability.40
In the presentation of such a case for conspiracy it suffices to
establish no more than a prima facie case of conspiracy to effect
the tentative admission into evidence of any statement made by
any one co-conspirator in the course of the conspiracy and con-
cerning the subject thereof against all of the remaining co-con-
spirators on trial.41 Rationalization of such a procedure is founded
on the assumption that ". . . when a conspiracy is established
37. Marrash v. United States, 168 Fed. 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1909).
38. Schine v. United States, 209 F. 2d 67, 74. (9th Cir. 1954). (Italics supplied).
Cf. Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n of Pugpet Sound, 236 Fed.
964 (W. D. Wash. 1916); People v. McCarthy, 256 App. Div. 522, 10 N. Y. S. 2d
978 (4th Dep't 1939).
39. See Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 668, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; United
States v. Harding, 81 F. 2d 563 (D. C. Cir. 1936). Cf. Schenck v. United States, 253
F. 212, 213, (E. D. Pa. 1918), aff'd. 249 U. .S. 47 (1918). See also Coates v. United
States, 59 F. 2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1932) :
"It is immaterial when any of the parties entered the polluted stream.
From the moment he entered he is as much contaminated and held as though
an original conspirator".
Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944) ; 328 U. S.
781 (1946). Williamn Goldman Theatres v. Loew's Inc., 150 F. 2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945).
40. Rex v. Meyrick and Ribuffi. supra note 26; United States v. Direct Sales Co.,
supra note 27. See also Martin v. United States, 100 F. 2d 490 (10th Cir., 1939).
41. See, e. g., Carnahan v. United States, 35 F. 2d 96 (1929).
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everything said, written, or done by any of the conspirators in
execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to havebeen said, done, or written by every one of them and may be
proved against each.'"4
Proof of conspiratorial liability for the act of another, more-
over, is specifically facilitated by the rule that while a member
of the "conspiracy", each conspirator is vicariously liable for all
crimes committed by his "co-conspirators" which can be said toflow naturally from the criminal design [to which he has become
a party], even if such crimes have not been specifically foreseen or
ratified as plausible consequences by himself or his "co-conspira-
tors" at any time. In the contemplation of the law "he has started
evil forces [and] he must . . . [therefore] incur the guilt of their
continuance. '  The explicitly underlying theory is that "...(a) conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes."44 Partner-
ship liabilities as to the component members continue until effec-
tive withdrawal from the conspiratorial association or until the
consummation of the conspiratorial purpose itself. This is ex-
emplified by the holding that any "overt act of one partner maybe the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed
to that act."14  As long, therefore, "as the partnership in crime
continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward
. . .The criminal intent to do the act is established by the forna-
tion of the conspiracy. Each conspirator [instigates] . . . the
commission of the crime . . . [The] overt act of one partner in
crime is [thus] attributable to all."14  In this context, any dis-
tinction between "agreeing" and "aiding and abetting" appears
at best hazy and at worst non-existent.1
In consequence of the emerging judge-made law effecting thehopeless intermingling of "conspiracy" with the law of parties, 48
42. 11 Am. Jura. CONSPIRACY, §40. See also Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.20 (1925); Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632 (1896).
43. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 369-370 (1912).
44. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 608 (1910).
45. Ibid.
46. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 646-647 (1946).47. See, e. g., Mr. Justice Jackson's comment on this type of analysis in Krulewivtch
v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 451 (1949).48. See, e. g., Smith v. State, 8 Ala. App. 187, 62 So. 575, 577 (1913):
"At common law a person may be connected with a felony either as a prin-
cipal in the first degree, as a principal in the second degree, or aider or abet-tor, as an accessory before the fact, or as an accessory after the fact. Aprincipal in the first degree is he that is 'the actor or absolute perpetrator
of the crime. A principal in the second degree is one who, at the time of the
commission of the felony, is present either near enough to render assistance
to the main design should the need arise-and aids or abets in its commis-sion . . .An 'accessory' is one who is not the chief actor in the felonious
Footnote continued on following page
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the standard of proof for the establishment of responsibility for
the act of another in criminal conspiracy is significantly reduced
beyond that maintained for the establishment of responsibility for
the physical act of another in ordinary crime. The character of
principal and conspirator respectively drawn from the law of
parties and of conspiracy, coalesce in the confines of a new judge-
made conspiratorial doctrine, invoked by judicial fiat. Where,
however, the traditional law of parties had enacted the establish-
ment of "aiding and abetting" as a fact to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt (the showing of an illicit mutual agreement
providing at best a link in a developing chain of independent
evidence)," the new law of conspiracy declares in effect, that the
mere proof of such an agreement operates as an irrebuttable pre-
Footnote continued from preceding page
offense, nor present at its perpetration, but is in some way concerned therein
either before or after the act is committed."
For the change wrought by a characteristic example of the contemporary statutory law
of parties, see 18 U. S. C. § 2:
"(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids,
abets, counsels' commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a
principal.
(b) Whoever causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him
would be an offense against the United States is also a principal and punish-
able as such."
18 U. S. C. §3:
"Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been com-
mitted, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder
or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the
fact. . .. "
Cf. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2, defining a principal as: "... (a) a person concerned in
the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense
or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, and a person who
directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a
crime . . ." and an accessory as ". . . (a) person who, after the commission of a
felony, harbors, conceals, or aids the offender, with intent that he may avoid or escape
from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, having knowledge or reasonable ground
to believe that such offender is liable to arrest, has been arrested, is indicted or con-
victed or has committed a felony . . ."
A blurring of any existing borderline between the law of conspiracy and the law
of parties is characteristic of a plethora of felony-murder prosecutions. See e. g.,
People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298 189 N. E. 225 (1934); People v. Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118
161 N. E. 441 (1928).
49. See, e. g., Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 581 (1941). See
particularly, Id. at 618-620:
"If there is no evidence of defendant's guilt except on the theory that he
caused a crime to be committed by another (whether by incitement or abet-
ment), it will obviously be necessary for the prosecution to prove the crime
was actually committed by another, and this must be established with the
same certainty as if the perpetrator himself were on trial . . . (beyond that
the) only sound procedure . . . is that the guilt of an inciter 'must be deter-
mined upon the facts which show the part he had' in the offense . .
Needless to say, substantial rights . . . should be safeguarded."
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sumption of the requisite "aiding and abetting", for purposes of
vicarious liability.50
The above standards appear hopelessly at odds in the appar-
ent clash between the requirements of specific intent, vicarious
liability and the sufficiency of relevant evidence. The existing
confusion appears best reflected in any attempt at the reconcilia-
tion of the irreconcilable. A standard authority's attempt at
enlightenment is not helpful :rl
There seems to be no doubt that in order to convict one of
being a party to a criminal conspiracy it is necessary to show
that he had a specific intent, i. e., he actually intended to com-
bine with another for the actual accomplishment of the pro-
hibited result or the use of the prohibited means. Suppose, how-
ever, that a defendant admits all just stated but truthfully
asserts that he was ignorant of the fact that the 'prohibited re-
sult' was a violation of law; in other words he acted innocently
in one sense of the word. Does the lack of this knowledge, a
state of mind, excuse him from a charge of criminal conspiracy
even though he may be guilty of another crime if the prohibited
result has been effected? The correct answer to this has been
asserted to be in the affirmative; but it appears to be a matter
that requires refined reasoning and there are decisions that ap-
pear to give a contrary answer.
The confusion in question, however, does not tend to the
incapacitation of the criminal prosecution; quite the contrary-
it serves effectively only to confound the criminal defense. It has
thus been noted that the "frequent practice of putting large num-
bers of defendants on trial together . . . [facilitates] the task
of the prosecution, is . . . apt to confuse the jury, and to raise
.a he-t[an] unwarranted implication of guilt" and that "the rule
that the acts and declaration of his co-defendants should be ad-
missible against . . . [the alleged conspirator] only after the
conspiracy is proved is, owing to the nature of the conspiracy
trial, usually of little practical protection to the individualdefendant;. 1 ,52
50. See Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S.
440, 451 (1949):
"A recent tendency has appeared in this Court to expand this elastic offense
(i. e. conspiracy) and to facilitate its proof. In Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U. S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489, it sustained a conviction of a
substantive crime where there was no proof of participation in or knowledge
of it, upon the novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law
to aiding and abetting." (Italics supplied).
Cf. Rent v. United States, 209 F. 2d 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
51. SEARS AND WEIHOFEN, op cit supra note 34 at 18.
52. Proposed Revisions in the Illinois Criminal Code, 48 NORTHWESTERN U. L.
REv. 198, 205-206 (1953).
Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750 (1946) ; United States v. Bruno, 105
F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939).
254
CONSPIRACY REVISITED
The fatal charms exerted by the rules of conspiracy may then
be said to be the obviation of numerous difficulties of proof and
the consequent operation of the conspiracy doctrine as a judge-
made law of substantive crime in areas devoid of what is judicially
deemed adequate traditional legislation. The areas of economic
and political crime seem to furnish the greatest incentive for the
contemporary invocation of conspiracy2 3
III.
The assertion that "... [the] picture of conspiracy as a
meeting by twilight of a trio of sinister persons with pointed hats,
close together belongs to a darker age' " is perhaps best borne out
in the essentially economic sphere of conspiratorial activity.
Conspirators in that sphere are rarely if ever, viewed as
"sinister persons" at all; a convincing proof of their specific
conspiratorial intent appears always difficult if not impossible.
Adequate and readily enforceable laws covering what at any
moment may be viewed as "undesirable" economic activities are
few and far between; in consequence what may look like "con-
spiratorial activity" to the elite may seem indistinguishable from
respectable business practice to wider strata of the populace;
moreover widespread forms of economic conspiracy are rarely
reminiscent of the incomplete offense whose growth invokes the
preventive action of the conspiracy doctrine as a part of the law
of inchoate crimes. There is, in fact rarely anything "inchoate"
about the "conspiratorial" economic transaction which awaits
discussion.
Such a transaction is cognizable, for the most part, as the
carrier of an immediate harm which appears past prevention.
(This, of course, is not meant to deny the possibility of its inherent
potential for more long-range detriment, a detriment against
which preventive measures might still be invoked.) Applied to
such a situation, the conspiracy doctrine appears primarily
directed at the repression of the manifest effects of "substantive
evil" and only secondarily at that of the preparatory confedera-
tions toward such an ends. In such a context, the function of the
doctrine appears more punitive than preventive and therefore
53. See Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58
YALE L. J. 1019 (1949); HALL, THEFr, LAW AND Soci-'r 155-345 (2d ed. 1952). Cf.
Donnelly, The New Yugoslav Criminal Code, 61 YALE L. J. 510; Nathanson, The Com-
munist Trial and the Clear and Present Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (1950);
Arens, Nuremberg and Group Prosecution, [1951] WASH. U. L. Q. 329.
54. TNEC Report, as quoted by Feahy, J. in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc. 150 F. 2d 738, 743, (3rd Cir. 1945) and again by Goodrich, J., in United
States v. Georga, 210 F. 2d 45, 48 (3d Cir. 1954).
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essentially indistinguishable from that of the law governing objec-
tive crime. In a sphere which is thought to be insufficiently cov-
ered by the "do's" and "don'ts" of traditional substantive law,
the conspiracy doctrine lends itself to use as a judicial makeshiftfor a modern code of criminal regulatory legislation.
The special coloration, assumed chameleon-like by conspiracyin this habitat, is vividly demonstrable against the respectivebackgrounds of traffic in "contraband" and enterprise "in re-
straint of trade."
Inherent within most judicially encountered conspiracies in-
volving the sale of contraband, without more, is the effect of mani-fest harm to the social order, i. e. the continued presence or
circulation within the body politic of the actually or potentiallydangerous or harmful articles under prohibition. The questionpresented in cases of the sale of "contraband" goods is therefore
whether infliction of criminal sanctions is to be restricted to the
active organizers of the traffic under the law of substantive crimes
or whether it is to extend to the passive participant e. g. "Ia 'wise'
owner of innocent goods which contribute to . . . [an] illegal
. . . [operation] ", or, e. g.; to an "ignorant" owner under iden-
tical circumstances, etc., on the theory of conspiracy. In the
absence of legislative guidance the answer appears to have been
furnished by a substantive law created by judicial fiat.
The trend of decision has demonstrated that .. . [in]
criminal actions charging the seller as a co-conspirator the courts
. . . have been . . . inclined to treat the seller as a participant
in the buyer's illicit enterprise. Knowingly giving the buyer aidby selling him goods has been regarded as the equivalent of an
express agreement between the seller and the buyer to act in con-
cert, thereby making the seller an active participant.""
A definite but inconspicuous deviation from this norm, how-
ever, was set by the leading case of United States v. Falcone."0
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether "one
who sells materials with the knowledge that they are intended for
use or will be used in the production of illicit distilled spirits maybe convicted as a conspirator with a distiller who conspired with
others to distill the spirits in violation of the revenue laws. "7
The Court of Appeals had concluded in the same case that a ven-
dor's conspiratorial liability under such circumstances not be
predicated on anything short of knowledge of, and participation
55. See Note, 261 IoWA L. REV. 122, 123 (1940) and cases cited therein.
56. 311 U. S. 205 (1940).
57. Id. at 206.
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in, the purchaser's conspiratorial activities.5 s The Supreme Court
affirmed:
[One] who without more furnishes supplies to an illicit distiller
is not guilty of conspiracy even though his sale may have fur-
thered the object of a conspiracy to which the distiller was a
party but of which the supplier had no knowledge.59
Unembarrassed by the Supreme Court decision, subsequent cases
have paid lip-service to the Supreme Court language, but have
essentially followed their own bent. United States v. Harriso'mO
confronted a substantially similar question in the light of the
earlier Supreme Court decision:
That question . . . [was] the legal position vis-a-vis a con-
spiracy of a seller who knows that the goods he supplies are
destined for an illegal use, or in other words, of a 'wise' owner
of innocent goods which contribute to the operation of an illegal
distillery. We can start with the assumption that an intention
to become a party to an illegal enterprise must be predicated on
some affirmative action. . . . The sale of goods surely consti-
tutes affirmative action.6 '
Affirming the conviction obtained below, the court, however,
was spared the difficulty of attributing the defendant's affirmative
action solely to the act of sale. Other overt behavior manifesta-
tions in aid of the conspiracy were available.2
In United States v. Direct Sales Co., 53 the court sustained the
assertion of a conspiratorial link between the defendants against
legal challenge upon these facts. The defendant Direct Sales
Company, a manufacturer of narcotics, had repeatedly solicited
the patronage of the defendant physician by the mailing of stand-
ard advertising. The defendant physician had responded to this
solicitation by a mail order of morphine sulphate in quantities
far in excess of the needs of the ordinary legitimate medical
practice.
[The defendant physician] was submitting order forms for one
thousand half-grain tablets of morphine sulphate on an average
of every five days, and . . . [later] more often.64
A warning delivered to the Direct Sales Company by a Nar-
cotics Agent to the effect that the average physician could not find
58. United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940).
59. 311 U. S. 205, 210-211 (1940).
60. United States v. Harrison, 121 F. 2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1941).
61. Id. at 932-933.
62. Id. at 934.
63. 44 F. Supp. 623 (W. D. S. C. 1942). Cf. generally, Carrado v. United States,
210 F 2d. 712 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
64. Id. at 625.
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a legitimate market for morphine in such quantities produced no
change in the developing pattern of order and shipment.
Investigation revealed that the defendant physician was dis-
pensing these drugs to addicts in violation of federal law. The
Court held that this Narcotic Act violation was in pursuance of
a common criminal conspiratorial design agreed to between vendor
and vendee and hence chargeable to both:
Direct Sales Company was bound to know that . . . [the
defendant physician] was buying morphine . . . for unlawful
purposes. . . . An unlawful agreement need not be shown
to exist in any formal way. In fact, it is a rare thing that an
unlawful agreement can be so shown. A mutual understanding
between the parties . . . is all that is necessary to prove a
conspiracy. . . . The guilt of a conspirator is not dependent
on his knowledge of the entire scope of the conspiracy, and one
conspirator need not know who all the other conspirators
are.65
It appears clear that the choice between severity and leniency
in the application of the conspiracy doctrine to vendors of "con-
traband" is determined by judicially preferred social and political
interests. A choice between contrasting doctrines, depends, it has
been observed, "upon an evaluation of how each best protects the
social, individual and commercial interests involved. On the one
hand, freedom of enterprise would be curbed if sellers were forced
to select their purchasers with care in order to prevent becoming
involved in their plans and conduct. Also, sellers should be pro-
tected from prosecutors who seek to prosecute as co-conspirators
all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the
main offenders. On the other hand, perhaps the seller should be
regarded as a co-conspirator, since his association with the con-
spiracy actually goes beyond a sympathetic attitude or acquies-
cence; his contribution is physical and essential to their success.
It would seem that the social interest invaded by such active as-
sistance should be protected."66
In any event a substantial question of what would ordinarily
be viewed as legislative policy is resolved by the courts under the
auspices of an elastic law of conspiracy.
It thus appears that successful vendor-vendee prosecutions
for conspiracy to traffic in contraband, of the type noted above,
are founded upon a demonstrably consummated objective harm of
some consequence. The latter is invariably discoverable in either
the circulation or concealment of the contraband. In this context
no seller, for example, has been held criminally responsible, unless
65. 1d. at 626-627 (italics supplied).
66. Note, 26 Iowa L. REv. 122, 125 (1940).
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he has in fact in some degree facilitated the forbidden traffic and,
one might add, with a bow to technical purists-unless he has
entertained the necessary conspiratorial purpose. In successful
prosecutions, actual facilitation of such traffic has been established
by clear and convincing evidence- 'beyond reasonable doubt";
it is only the establishment of the necessary conspiratorial pur-
pose which often seems to have been lacking in persuasiveness.
While the ease with which the requisite intent can be attributed to
the defendant under such auspices may seem objectionable at first
blush, it is no more so than the comparable disposition of ques-
tions of state of mind under the auspices of the absolute prohibi-
tions encountered in increasing numbers in the field of regulatory
legislation.1 Despite their differences in background, the offenses
in both categories, appear operative as substantive crimes.
The manifest effect of immediate harm to the social order
is at least equally inherent within the violation of the Sherman
Act-at least in terms of operative policy preferences. Remedial
legislation, designed for the maintenance of a preferred form of
economic equilibrium, the Sherman Act 8 had been significantly
if partially accepted in "the belief that great industrial consoli-
dations are inherently undesirable regardless of their economic
results."169 The tendency of the contemporary judicial elite has
been to attribute the legislation to fear of the "curse of bigness"
and hence to the "desire to put an end to great aggregations of
capital because of the helplessness of the individual before
them. "170
In the light of such an interpretation of dominant ecopolitical
(economic-political) policy, conspiracies in restraint of trade and
conspiracies to monopolize stand on the same footing as judicially
recognized "substantive evils" as price-fixing or the acquisition
of the power to monopolize, etc. 1- Since the Sherman Act is thus
viewed as directed at all manner of undue aggregations of eco-
nomic power, an economic conspiratorial association or combina-
tion is without more as clearly demonstrable a substantive evil
as an illegal monopoly. This is so because like the monopoly, it
contributes to a greater or lesser extent to the "helplessness of
67. United States v. Dotterweich, 3 O U. S. 277 (1943) ; United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100 (1941); See also Jackson, Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences in
DAviEs, JACKSON, KENNY, RAD zNowicz, STALLYBRASS, TURNER, WADE, WORTLEY, THE
MODERN APPROACH TO CRimrNAL LAW, COLLECTED ESSAYS, (Preface by Winfield), 262
(1945).
68. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 respectively outlawing conspiracies in restraint of
trade and conspiracies to monopolize.
69. United States v. Aluminum Co,npany of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 428 (2d Cir.
1945), per L. Hand, J.
70. Ibid. The opinion also provides valuable excerpts from congressional statements
in documentation of legislative history, as e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 2460.
71. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
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the individual" before its bigness: "M fere size . . . under the
present concept of the higher courts, carries with it an opportunity
for abuse that cannot be ignored."7 2
Conspiracies in this field are thus indistinguishable from the
traditional substantive crimes as completed rather than inchoate
offenses-with this difference-that in conspiracies under the
Sherman Act the Government is prosecuting a substantive crime
which is the product of judicial ingenuity instead of democratic
legislation. Proof of agreement within such a context constitutes
a legal fiction and does not tend to enforce a rational evidentiary
requirement. It is thus that "economic activities which operate
in fact to restrain trade" are attributed to individuals who al-
though capable of exerting effective control over such practices
are in no way rationally proved to play the role of conscious par-
ticipants in the emerging economic plan which is labelled criminal.
The fact that the proof of illegal agreement within such a
context constitutes a fiction is now demonstrable by a plethora
of evidence. A mere sampling should suffice.
It has thus been shown that an "anti-trust prosecution" for
an alleged conspiracy, can attempt "to establish the necessary
'joint action' within the confines of the single enterprise. And
in a large measure courts have viewed these attempts with favor,
looking more to the economic abuses before them than to the
doctrinal issue presented." 7 3
It is under such circumstances that it is "revealed" to be
in the nature of things that a manufacturing corporation can
conspire "with its wholly owned sales and financing subsidiaries"
to violate the anti-trust laws,74 that the officers of a corporate
enterprise are capable of conspiring with the corporation in the
same vein, the individuals and the corporate unit being counted
as separate "persons", and that, similarly, two or more corpora-
tions can similarly conspire with each other to their hearts' con-
tent.5 It is difficult in this light to sustain the contention that the
requirement that there be two or more persons for a commission
of a conspiracy has not been eliminated to all intent and purposes.
However, it is not only the easy satisfaction of the require-
ment that there be two or more persons for the commission of
72. CAR, Ax AMEICAN ENTERPISE, 234 (1952).
73. Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE
L. J. 372, 374 (1954) and cases cited therein.
74. Id. at 375.
75. See generally, comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Sherman Act,
supra note 73; Are Two or More Persons Necessary to Have a Conspiracy Under
Section I of the Sherman Act? 43 Ir.. L Rv. 551 (1948).
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conspiratorial activities, but also the relaxation of traditional
standards of general proof, which serve to show the unlawful
agreement as an empty fiction in the conspiracy prosecutions under
the Sherman Act.
The very scope and complexity of the contemporary economic
practices tending toward monopolies or restraints of trade have
enabled anti-trust enthusiasts to conceal policy preferences under
the guise of procedural necessity. It is, of course, readily recog-
nized that a "unique aspect of . . . (anti-trust) issues is their
typical vastness of scope, whether the issue be one of industry
history, the purpose and effect of some continuing distribution
practice or the scale of operation necessary to draw the maximum
benefit from modern technology and to contribute to the future
development of that technology."
7 6
Obviation of such difficulty has proceeded by way of objectifi-
cation of the "state of mind", traditionally associated with tho
requisite specific intent. The test generally adopted by the courts
under such circumstances is not so much whether the defendants
knew of the consequences of their planned activities but rather
whether they should have known. In -the leading case of Inter-
state Circuit v. United States, the Supreme Court imputed the
necessary intent and participation in a common criminal design
to restrain trade, allegedly engaged in by distributors of motion
pictures in these words:
[A]s is usual in [such] cases of alleged unlawful agreements
. . the government is without the aid of direct testimony
. . . In order to establish agreement it is compelled to rely
on inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged
conspirators..
It [is] enough that, knowing that concerted action was contem-
plated . the distributors gave their adherence to the
scheme and participated in it. Each distributor was advised
that the others were asked to participate; each knew that co-
operation was essential to successful operation of the plan. They
knew that the plan, if carried out would result in a restraint of
commerce . . and knowing it all, participated in the plan.
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of
an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence
of which, if carried out is restraint of interstate commerce, is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sher-
man Act.7
7
76. Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. J.
1019 (1949).
77. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 227 (1939) ; cf. Marino v.
United States, 91 F. 2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Motion Picture Patents
Co., 225 Fed. 800 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
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It is almost as if the ancient common law maxim, applied to
crimes requiring a general intent, has been resurrected within
the field of conspiracies in restraint of trade, to wit that men are
presumed to intend the natural consequences flowing from their
actions. It may thus be clearly established that an alleged con-
spirator was wholly ignorant of the purposes of the conspiracy
as of the time of his initial adherence to the common purpose. If
suffices, that having been able, as a reasonable man, to discover
such purposes through prolonged collaboration or association with
his "co-conspirators" he persisted in such collaboration or asso-
ciation, to hold him liable under the chameleon-like conspiracy
doctrine of our time. The courts have made short shift of any
defenses based upon ignorance of purpose at the inception of
conspiratorial activities:
It is not clear at what precise point of time each appellee be-
came aware of the fact that its contract was not an isolated
transaction but part of a larger arrangement. But it is clear
that, as the arrangement continued each became familiar with
its purpose and scope.78
A virtual scrapping of any requirements of the state of mind,
traditionally associated with specific intent was effected by the
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Patten:
[T]he conspirators must be held to have intended the neces-
sary and direct consequences of their acts and cannot be heard
to say the contrary. In other words by purposely engaging in a
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result
which the statute is designed to prevent, they are in legal con-
templation, chargeable with intending that result.79
It is not difficult to see how the peculiar characteristics of the
anti-trust conspiracy prosecution, brought about both by the judi-
cially enforced "improvement" of an allegedly defective formal
substantive law and the inherent difficulty in the procurement of
evidence, have brought about a situation which is sui generis.
As in the case of successful conspiracy prosecutions for traffic
in contraband, the successful conspiracy prosecutions for monopo-
lies or for restraint of trade are founded upon a demonstrably
consummated objective harm of some consequence-that is if one
accepts current judicial policy predispositions. In successful pros-
ecutions of this kind the fact of dangerous economic aggregation or
of tendencies toward restraint of trade, as necessary consequences
of evolving business patterns have similarly been established by
78. Vnited States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 275 (1942).79. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543 (1913) ; cf. People v. Spevack, 253App. Div. 638, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (1st Dep't 1938) ; People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251(1893).
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clear and convincing evidence-' 'beyond reasonable doubt"; it is
only the establishment of the necessary conspiratorial purpose
which often seems to have been lacking in persuasiveness.
An essentially identical usage, it will be recalled, has charac-
terized the disposition of intent in the operation of the absolute
prohibitions of regulatory legislation and has been accepted in
that field without dire results.
A demand for the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, as
judicially defined, can, in the absence of additional legislative
remedies, be met only by the continuance of present judicial prac-
tice.
Only necessity would appear to justify this judicial activism.
A democratically voiced, if not formalized demand for the enforce-
ment of the anti-trust laws, absent other legislative remedies,
would appear to constitute such a necessity.
One would suppose, however, that notwithstanding legislative
acquiescence in this type of judicial legislation the conspiracy
rules evolved within such a context would be rigidly confined to
it and not permitted to extend to any other area. This is not the
case. It is noteworthy that ". . . [without] recognizing that the
remedial nature of such statutes [i. e. anti-trust statutes] in-
evitably has affected decisions thereunder, courts have sometimes
on the authority of such decisions held proof of specific intent
unnecessary in other types of conspiracy cases." ' 10  The incubus
created by the law of conspiracy in this manner has not been con-
fined to a mere handful of new prosecutions. It has instead
spread its tentacles into a wide variety of fields not least of which
is the political conspiracy.
IV.
The assertion that "[the] picture of conspiracy as a meeting
by twilight of a trio of sinister persons with pointed hats, close
together belongs to a darker age" has been increasingly chal-
lenged as misleading when applied to the essentially political
sphere of conspiratorial activity.
Under the strain and stress of the bipolarization of world
power, Communists (universally recognizable by subservience to
Soviet interests) have indeed come to be viewed as 'sinister
persons" who, if not "meeting by twilight with pointed hats" can
be counted on at all hours to be engaged in more mischief with
less melodrama.
80. The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276, 280-282 (1948) and cases cited therein.
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In increasing measure public attitudes have tended toward the
identification of the Communist as a threat toward the internal
as well as the external security of the non-Communist nation. An
official United States position has been concisely expressed by
Attorney-General Brownell:
Let us not delude ourselves any longer. We might just as well
face up to the fact that the Communists are subversives and con-
spirators, working fanatically in the interest of a hostile foreign
power. Again and again they have demonstrated that an in-
tegral part of their policy is the internal disruption and de-
struction of this and other free governments of the world.8 '
In this light the political conspirators encountered at this
stage and the economic conspirators, visited above, appear poles
apart.
No uncertainty in public attitudes beclouds the approach to
the security problems of the times.
Recent security legislation provides sufficient proof of the
availability of the legislative weapon against subversion. 2  An
expanding system of criminal sanctions can be readily invoked to
repress the perceptible manifestations of social harm in the field
of security.
To the extent to which it succeeds in avoiding the existing
substantive (non-conspiratorial) legislative prohibitions, political
conspiracy looms largest as an inchoate crime whose social harm
is manifested in the future. In this context the primary function of
conspiracy law would appear preventive.
It is elementary that every organized government will seek
to secure its authority against organized violence. Survival itself
is at stake. Reason dictates not only the repression but the pre-
vention of disturbances threatening social disintegration. The
rejection of anarchy as a way of life suffices to require the rejec-
tion of "any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparation for revolution. ' 3  It follows that "it is within the
power of the Congress to protect the government of the United
States from armed rebellion . . .No one could conceive that it is
not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to
overthrow the government by force and violence." 8 4
81. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORN=LL L. Q. 195, 201(1954).82. See, e. g., Comment, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REV. 606(1951).
83. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 501 (1951).
84. Ibid.
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How far, then, must the meshes of the law be spread to fulfill
the necessary preventive function in such cases?
None can question the reasonableness of the attempt of the law
to spare the country the impact of such disturbances as insurrec-
tion, espionage, sabotage and kindred offenses against its security
by "nipping the plan in the bud" long before its consummation.
In such a context the law of inchoate crimes cannot dispense
with the conspiracy doctrine if it is to fulfill any significant pre-
ventive function. None can question, therefore, the reasonable-
ness of the superimposition of the general prohibition against
conspiracy8 5 over the various overt crimes against security. In
the fulfillment of such a preventive function it makes sense to
prosecute under a general or a special conspiracy statute 6 for
an agreement to commit espionage,8 7 sabotage 8 or kindred crimes
long before the infliction of any substantive harm. It makes
sense to punish a "seditious conspiracy," encompassed whenever
"two or more persons . . . in any State or Territory, or in any
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire
to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the government of
the United States or to levy war against them, or to oppose by
force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay
the execution of any law of the United States . . .
If no formal agreement between such conspirators need be
proved it is because the conspiratorial methods are indeed "de-
vious, hidden, secret and clandestine" and an agreement for the
procurement of overt acts of violence or those bordering upon
violence is subject to rational inference from available overt be-
havior patterns 0 The inferential nexus between the manifesta-
tion of acts and the agreement to act need never become danger-
ously tenuous.
A radically different situation, however, arises under a law
which authorizes a conspiracy prosecution on the theory that two
or more persons conspired to help to organize a group preparing
to advocate the desirability of the overthrow of government by
85. 18 U. S. C. § 371.
86. The general conspiracy statute is 18 USCA § 371. A good example of a
special conspiracy statute is 18 USCA § 794 which provides for the infliction of identical
penalties for conspiracy to violate as well as the actual violation of certain espionage
prohibitions.
87. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 792-797.
88. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 2152-2156.
89. 18 U. S. C. § 2384.
90. See, e. g., Wells v. United States, 257 Fed. 605 (9th Cir. 1919) ; Bryant v. United
Slates, 257 Fed. 378 (5th Cir. 1919) ; cf. United States v. Georga,. 210 F. 2d 45 (3d Cir.
1954).
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force and violence." The statutory link between the individual
and the illicit end is patently too tenuous to maintain a meaningful
requirement of proof of a specific intent. As in cases of economic
conspiracy, the "finding" of a conspiratorial agreement must of
necessity rest upon inference piled upon inference. In Dennis v.
United States9 2 the top Communist leadership was accused of:
[W]ilfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the
Communist Party of the United States of America a society
. . . of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and de-
struction of the government of the United States by force and
violence, and (2) knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach
the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the gov-
ernment of the United States by force and violence 93-
a far cry indeed from the accusation encountered in the prosecu-
tion of an economic conspiracy. Yet the "chameleon-like" law of
conspiracy of this case seemed essentially reflective of that of such
a classic in the field of economic conspiracy as Interstate Circuit
v. United States.9 4
Evidence, essentially reflective of parallel activities by the
defendants, sufficed in the final analysis, to establish the requisite
conspiratorial agreement in each case. In Interstate Circuit v.
United States, the conspiratorial liability emerged from essentially
no more than the parallel acceptance by defendants of uniform
commercial practices; in Dennis v. United States, the conspira-
torial liability emerged from essentially no more than the parallel
acceptance by defendants of uniform political proselytizing prac-
tices.
91. 18 U. S. C. § 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the
United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years or both.
18 U. S. C. § provides inter alia:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of . . . government by force or violence . . . Shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both . . .
For obvious reasons these two enactments lend themselves to combined use.
92. 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
93. Id. 497.
Cf. id. at 579, Mr. Justice Black, dissenting:
"At the outset I want to emphasize what the crime involved in this case is,
and what it is not. These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to
overthrow the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any
kind designed to overthrow the government. They were not even charged
with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the gov-
ernment. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and to
publish certain ideas at a later date. The indictment is that they conspired
to organize the Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other
publications in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of
the government."
94. 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
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That the same doctrinal variation of conspiracy had been
made to fit both situations was in fact explicitly assumed by M[r.
Justice Jackson, concurring, not without some misgivings, in
Dennis v. United States:95
Conspiracies of labor unions, trade associations, and news
agencies have been condemned, although accomplished, evi-
denced and carried out, like the conspiracy here, chiefly by let-
ter-writing, meetings, speeches and organization. Indeed this
court seems particularly in cases where the conspiracy has eco-
nomic ends, to be applying its doctrines with increasing sever-
ity. While I consider criminal conspiracy a dragnet device
.no reason appears for applying it only to concerted ac-
tion claimed to disturb interstate commerce and withholding it
from those claimed to undermine our whole government.
Since the standard of proof of agreement is thus admittedly
subjective and hence unpredictable, the conspiracy doctrine oper-
ates, in effect, to repress completed yet undefined activities;
punishable conspiracies thereby take on the appearance of sub-
stantive rather than inchoate crimes. (The preventive role of
conspiracy as an inchoate crime would depend on an effective
retention of the traditional specific intent.) In the meantime, the
political conspiracy of the Dennis type confronts us as a judge-
made law of substantive crime on an ad hoc basis. Its vagueness
provides unlimited possibilities for abuse.
It has been rightly remarked in this connection:
[under] such circumstances the limits of permissible political
action would become obscure and therefore seriously restricted.
In actual operation a program of this nature could be carried
out only through an apparatus of secret political police, inform-
ers, and undercover agents, and amid an atmosphere of public
passion and fear.96
If, therefore, the protection of the individual defendant still
remains of some concern to democratic social order, however
greatly threatened by totalitarian violence, the conspiracy prose-
cution does not present a fair or rational method of defense. If
the repression of specific political group activity appears manda-
tory, outlawry of specific organizations under legislative auspices
would be preferable to conspiracy prosecution under present law.
However unfamiliar to the American scene outlawry under
legislative auspices would have definite advantages, not enjoyed
95. 341 U. S. 494, 572 (1951).
cf. United States v. Foster, 9 F. R. D. 367 (D. N. Y. 1947).
96. Memorandum in support of defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment, filed
in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York in the
case of United States v. Flynn by Frank Serri and Thomas 1. Emerson in 1951.
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under varying forms of conspiracy prosecution under present law.
It would thus provide advance notice of its scope with adequate
clarity; it would establish essential standards of certainty for its
administration; it would bar the retractivity of its application.
In any case it would eliminate the possibility of the irresponsible
and invisible exercise of power through judge-made law. Distaste-
ful though it might be it would be more representative of "govern-
ment of laws and not of men" than most contemporary conspiracy
practices outside the scope of inchoate crimes. This appears to
have been the solution reached in some situations on the European
continent.9 7
CoNcL SION.
The problem presented is essentially a matter of politics and
hence legislative policy. This, however, does not exonerate the
courts. Compelled though they are to resort to the conspiracy
doctrine at the instigation of the prosecution it is high time that
they recognized the conspiracy doctrine for what it is, i. e., that
it does not require the proof of specific intent in a large number
of cases, as it would appear to do on a superficial reading of the
statutes. This the courts should say. Let the courts under such
circumstances proclaim the requisite "agreement" to be a mere
legal fiction. The legislatures may then be aroused to set things
right by an informed electorate.
97. See Wagner, Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries, 42 J. CRIm. L. & ClaMINOL.
171 (1951).
